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RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
Wesley J. Campbell* 
ABSTRACT 
Governmental neutrality is the heart of the modern Free Exercise 
Clause. Mindful of this core principle, which prevents the government 
from treating individuals differently because of their religious 
convictions, the Supreme Court held in Employment Division v. Smith 
that a neutral law can be constitutionally applied despite any incidental 
burdens it might impose on an individual’s exercise of religion. 
Conscientious objectors such as Quakers, for instance, do not have a 
constitutional right to be exempt from a military draft. Thus, neutrality 
now forms both the core and the outer limit of constitutionally 
guaranteed religious freedom. Judged according to founding-era views, 
however, this interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is deeply 
problematic. Although historical scholarship has focused on the 
particular issue of religious exemptions, this Article takes a different 
approach by reexamining early debates about neutrality itself. These 
neglected sources demonstrate that modern cases invert the founding-
era conception of religious freedom. For the Founders, religious freedom 
was primarily an unalienable natural right to practice religion—not a 
right that depended on whether a law was neutral. This evidence 
illuminates not only a significant transition in constitutional meaning 
since the Founding but also the extent to which modern priorities often 
color our understanding of the past.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The core of our modern understanding of religious freedom is 
governmental neutrality—a principle that generally forbids the 
government from treating people differently on the basis of their 
religious beliefs.1 In Sherbert v. Verner, for example, the Supreme Court 
declared that “[t]he door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly 
closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.”2 
Any law that “establishes a religious classification”3 is therefore 
unconstitutional even if the law neither infringes upon a person’s 
practice of religion nor deprives the individual of a civil right.4 Based on 
this principle, the Supreme Court has held that the federal and state 
governments may not discriminate against particular religious groups,5 
prevent clergy from serving in civil offices,6 or bar atheists from 
becoming notaries public.7 The same neutrality requirement also applies 
even if the law is “rewarding religious beliefs as such.”8  
While considering neutrality as the core principle of religious 
freedom, the Supreme Court has also evaluated whether facially neutral 
                                                 
1  This definition of religious neutrality follows the holdings of modern free exercise 
decisions. See infra note 4. Some scholars have posited other meanings of neutrality. 
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 
DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 994 (1990). 
2  374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City 
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (“[A] law targeting religious beliefs as such is never 
permissible . . . .”). 
3  McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 631–32 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(“Whether or not the provision discriminates among religions . . . it establishes a religious 
classification . . . .”). 
4  See, e.g., id. at 633 (“[T]hat the law does not interfere with free exercise because 
it does not directly prohibit religious activity, but merely conditions eligibility for office on 
its abandonment—is also squarely rejected by precedent.”); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 
488, 495–96 (1961) (“The fact . . . that a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot 
possibly be an excuse for barring him from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden by the 
Constitution.”). One decision potentially in conflict with a neutrality-based view is Locke v. 
Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004), which rejected a free-exercise challenge to a state’s denial 
of a government-funded vocational scholarship that an individual wished to use to fund 
religious training in preparation for a career in the ministry. In Locke, the majority found 
it significant that the State had conditioned the receipt of funds on the student’s choice of 
vocation, which the Court considered as distinct from the student’s religious beliefs. Id. at 
720–21 (“And it does not require students to choose between their religious beliefs and 
receiving a government benefit. The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct 
category of instruction.” (footnote and citations omitted)). 
5  Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69–70 (1953). 
6  McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628–29 (plurality opinion). 
7  Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 489, 495. 
8  McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
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laws violate the Free Exercise Clause when their enforcement 
incidentally interferes with an individual’s religious beliefs or practices. 
In the decades prior to 1990, the Supreme Court held that “[a] regulation 
neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the 
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly 
burdens the free exercise of religion.”9 In other words, a law ostensibly 
having nothing to do with religion (such as a military draft) could 
nonetheless unconstitutionally burden the free exercise rights of 
particular individuals (such as conscientious objectors). In these 
instances, the Court formerly applied strict scrutiny and required the 
government to prove a compelling interest for infringing upon an 
individual’s religious practice.10 In taking this position, the Court 
explained that not applying strict scrutiny to neutral infringements upon 
the individual right to free exercise would “relegate[] a serious First 
Amendment value to the barest level of minimal scrutiny that the Equal 
Protection Clause already provides.”11  
In Employment Division v. Smith, however, the Supreme Court 
shifted course, holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not provide an 
individual right of religious exemption from facially neutral laws.12 In 
particular, the five-Justice majority decided that states can enforce their 
controlled substance laws against Native Americans who use 
hallucinogenic drugs as part of their sacramental practices.13 The 
government still may not discriminate under the guise of facially neutral 
laws, but following Smith, the constitutional inquiry centers on the 
governmental action—not the law’s effect on individuals.14 In other 
words, governmental neutrality now is not just the core of 
constitutionally protected religious liberty; it also marks the outer 
boundary. 
                                                 
9  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972). 
10  Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987). 
11  Id. at 141–42 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 727 (1986) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
12  494 U.S. 872, 878–79, 890 (1990). 
13  Id. at 873–74, 890. Justice O’Connor filed a separate concurring opinion 
criticizing the majority’s departure from “established free exercise jurisprudence,” but she 
agreed that Oregon could prohibit the religious use of peyote because she thought the law 
survived heightened scrutiny under existing doctrine. Id. at 902, 907 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
14  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 
(1993) (“Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be 
shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise 
Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked as well as overt.”). In 
these instances, it is critical to realize that the constitutional infirmity—at least according 
to the Court—is not the effect of the law on individuals. Rather, the government’s effort to 
target those individuals is what offends the First Amendment. Id. 
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With the rise of originalism jurisprudence, historical evidence has 
played a significant role in modern debates about how to interpret the 
Free Exercise Clause. Because it is now accepted that the government 
may not discriminate on the basis of religion, these debates have 
generally focused on the question presented in Smith: whether the Free 
Exercise Clause provides an individual right of religious exemption from 
neutral, generally applicable laws.15 In City of Boerne v. Flores,16 for 
example, Justice Scalia’s concurrence and Justice O’Connor’s dissent 
wrangled over whether Smith was consistent with the original meaning 
of the Free Exercise Clause.17 Historical arguments have also been 
featured prominently in discussions among academic scholars. Michael 
McConnell writes that the “doctrine of free exercise exemptions is more 
consistent with the original understanding than is a position that leads 
only to the facial neutrality of legislation.”18 Others vigorously dispute 
that claim. Philip Hamburger, for instance, argues that “late eighteenth-
century Americans tended to assume that the Free Exercise Clause did 
not provide a constitutional right of religious exemption from civil 
laws.”19 Neither position has garnered scholarly consensus, in part 
because founding-era debates about exemptions were often mired in 
uncertainty.20 Nonetheless, scholarly debates about religious freedom 
                                                 
15  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
16  521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
17  Id. at 537–38 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 544–45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
18  Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1512 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins]; 
see also Walter J. Walsh, The First Free Exercise Case, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 39–40 
(2004) (arguing that early state free exercise decisions support religious exemptions). 
19  Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An 
Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 916 (1992) [hereinafter Hamburger, 
Religious Exemption]; see also Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and 
the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245, 247–48 (1991) (arguing on historical 
grounds against religious exemptions); see also Ellis M. West, The Right to Religion-Based 
Exemptions in Early America: The Case of Conscientious Objectors to Conscription, 10 J.L. 
& RELIGION 367, 370–71 (1993–1994). 
20  Several factors account for the indeterminacy of nineteenth-century religious 
exemption cases. First, eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century views about 
theology, evidence rules, and judicial review differed dramatically from our own, thus 
limiting our ability to glean constitutional meaning out of these early cases. Wesley J. 
Campbell, Note, A New Approach to Nineteenth-Century Religious Exemption Cases, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 973, 976 (2011). Moreover, early jurists may have applied something akin to 
our modern “compelling governmental interest” test whereby a compelling governmental 
interest can be sufficient to override a person’s individual liberty claim. See Michael W. 
McConnell, Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of Conscience?: A Critique 
of Justice Scalia’s Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
819, 845–46 (1998) [hereinafter McConnell, Freedom from Persecution] (“The most 
persuasive interpretation of the state precursors of the Free Exercise Clause, therefore, is 
that they provided substantive protection for religious conduct, except for acts that violate 
the peace and safety of the state or the rights of others.”). Thus, it is often difficult when 
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remain active, and the Court continues to wrestle with the often 
uncomfortable implications of its Smith decision.21 
Historical studies by legal scholars have focused almost exclusively 
on early American debates about exemptions and ignored debates about 
neutrality. McConnell, for instance, acknowledges that most early 
nineteenth-century religious-freedom cases involved witnesses excluded 
from testifying because of their faith, or prosecutions for blasphemous 
statements, but he does not discuss these cases because they “involved 
laws specifically directed at religion” and therefore “did not raise the 
exemption question.”22 The scholarly focus on exemption cases is 
perfectly natural, of course, but it also has led scholars to overlook a 
wealth of historical materials not directly related to exemption debates 
but nonetheless integral to understanding how the Founders thought 
about religious freedom. In particular, debates concerning religious 
neutrality oftentimes better reveal the values and priorities implicit in 
founding-era understandings of free exercise.   
Only one scholar has examined how these early debates about 
neutrality bear on the exemption question. In an important historical 
analysis of religious exemptions, Gerard Bradley persuasively 
demonstrates that courts were historically unwilling to overturn laws 
that facially discriminated on the basis of religious belief.23 Bradley then 
pounces on McConnell’s dismissal of religious neutrality cases as 
unconnected to the exemption debate by stating, “[O]ne has to wonder 
about the coherence of [McConnell’s] project: courts would enforce laws 
‘specifically directed at religion’ (and thus intentionally coerce belief), 
but not laws that pursued secular goals incidentally burdening belief.”24 
With such indifference toward religious neutrality, Bradley argues, 
judges surely were unwilling to provide exemptions from neutral laws.25 
                                                                                                                  
reading early cases to discern whether jurists rejected the possibility of exemptions 
generally, or instead thought an exemption was not warranted in the context of particular 
cases notwithstanding constitutional protection for other exemptions. 
21  See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. 
Ct. 694, 706–07 (2012) (addressing whether and to what extent the First Amendment 
affords religious institutions constitutional exemptions from certain employment laws). 
22  McConnell, Origins, supra note 18, at 1503. 
23  Bradley, supra note 19, at 271–72, 275–76, 285. 
24  Id. at 274. Bradley argues that blasphemy and testimonial exclusion cases were 
not “directed at religion” but rather aimed at the religiously neutral goals of protecting 
public safety and ensuring testimonial veracity. Id. at 274–77. He clarifies, however, that 
“[t]o the extent that the cases are ‘directed at religion,’ their significance cuts deeply into 
McConnell’s case.” Id. at 277. Under modern neutrality principles, these laws would be 
“directed at religion,” irrespective of whether the government was pursuing a neutral goal. 
See supra note 4.  
25  See id. at 275. 
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Although perhaps counterintuitive, early judicial enforcement of 
facially discriminatory laws actually supports the historical argument for 
religious exemptions. State governments during the Founding Era 
generally accommodated minority religious practices while 
simultaneously restricting certain civil privileges on the basis of 
religious belief.26 When considering the consistency of these 
discriminatory laws with constitutionally protected religious liberty, late 
eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century judges, legislators, and 
other legal commentators frequently noted that governmental 
classifications were legitimate so long as they did not infringe upon a 
person’s free exercise. By putting aside our modern priorities and 
rereading these debates on their own terms, the original meaning of the 
First Amendment becomes much clearer: The Free Exercise Clause 
guaranteed a natural, unalienable right of religious freedom—not a right 
to governmental neutrality.  
This Article argues that in order to understand the Founders’ views 
regarding religious exemptions, we must first understand how they 
thought about religious liberty more generally and how much that 
viewpoint differs from our own. Part I lays the theoretical groundwork of 
the paper by describing two theories of religious freedom: the 
governmental neutrality approach and the individual liberty approach. 
Early state and federal constitutional provisions concerning religious 
freedom are presented in Part II, which analyzes the values and 
priorities underlying those provisions. Part III then discusses judicial 
decisions and other early nineteenth-century debates about religious 
neutrality. In particular, this Part analyzes neglected evidence from 
testimonial exclusion cases, test oath debates, blasphemy prosecutions, 
and religious assessment controversies. As argued in Part IV, 
nineteenth-century perspectives regarding religious neutrality are an 
under-utilized yet remarkably revealing source for understanding the 
original public meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. The Article does not 
take a normative position about how much this historical meaning 
should matter in modern jurisprudence, and it certainly does not aim to 
undercut modern neutrality jurisprudence.27 To those who factor original 
meaning into their constitutional calculus, however, historical evidence 
casts doubt on the Supreme Court’s current refusal to recognize the 
                                                 
26  See infra Part III. 
27  The proper home for neutrality values, however, may be elsewhere in the 
Constitution, particularly in the Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. 
Rather than attack neutrality principles, this Article argues that the Court’s current focus 
on neutrality tends to warp its understanding of original free-exercise principles. 
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constitutional underpinnings of an individual right to religious 
accommodation.28 
I. TWO THEORIES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
Before turning to the historical evidence, it is important to explain 
two general theories of religious freedom that animate modern debates 
about the Free Exercise Clause. One of these theories, labeled here as 
the individual liberty theory, focuses on the primacy of religious duties 
for individuals. For adherents to this view, the core of religious liberty is 
individual freedom to practice religion without legal constraints, even if 
those legal constraints are not directly or intentionally aimed at religion. 
The second theory, labeled here as the neutrality theory, focuses on 
governmental actions. Here, the central question is whether the law 
treats people differently because of their religious beliefs or practices.29 
The basic contours of these two theories are best illustrated through 
examples. Some laws would offend both theories of religious freedom. 
For instance, a law banning the Christian rite of communion would 
infringe upon the individual liberty of Christians to practice their 
religion, yet the same law would also be non-neutral because it would 
discriminate on the basis of religion. Many laws, however, would offend 
one approach but not the other. Forbidding all uses of wine, for example, 
would interfere with the individual liberty of some Christians to practice 
communion, but it would nonetheless be neutral because it would apply 
to everyone without targeting a religious practice. By contrast, a law 
preventing Catholics from serving in the legislature would violate 
neutrality principles by targeting Catholics, but it would not offend 
individual liberty because, strictly understood, serving in the legislature 
has nothing to do with Catholic religious practices. These theories are 
not incompatible with each other, but they nonetheless reflect 
fundamentally different outlooks about the source and purpose of 
religious liberty. 
                                                 
28  Recognizing that religious exemptions have constitutional underpinnings is 
important even if one thinks that Smith was correctly decided for prudential reasons. That 
is because the constitutional nature of exemption claims suggests that even if they are not 
judicially enforceable, other branches of government still have a constitutional duty to 
afford exemptions. Moreover, the prudential concerns that might have influenced the Court 
in Smith should be beside the point when assessing congressional attempts to protect free 
exercise under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. But see City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535–36 (1997). 
29  Keeping largely to the terms of the founding-era debates, this Article 
concentrates on classifications between religious groups rather than classifications based 
on whether someone has any religious belief. Modern neutrality principles, of course, also 
prevent discrimination against those without religious faith. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 
367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). 
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As explained in the Introduction, the Supreme Court has openly 
adopted a neutrality-based approach to the Free Exercise Clause. In 
Employment Division v. Smith, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion 
declared,  
The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to 
believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. Thus, the 
First Amendment obviously excludes all “governmental regulation of 
religious beliefs as such.” The government may not . . . impose special 
disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status . . . .30  
Protecting neutrality, however, was as far as the Court was willing to go. 
With very limited exceptions, the Court in Smith rejected an individual 
liberty interpretation of religious freedom. “[T]he right of free exercise,” 
Justice Scalia wrote, “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to 
comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the 
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion 
prescribes (or proscribes).’”31 In other words, neutral laws applicable to 
everyone are constitutional despite any unintended burdens they might 
impose on religious practices. According to the Court, “Conscientious 
scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious 
toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not 
aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.”32 Nineteenth-
century neutrality cases, however, suggest that the Court’s fleeting 
reference to history may have been misguided. 
II. NEUTRALITY AT THE FOUNDING  
In the 1780s, every state constitution or declaration of rights 
included a religious liberty provision, although the exact language of 
these articles differed between states.33 Scholars have thoroughly 
                                                 
30  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)). 
31  Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment)). 
32  Id. (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 
(1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Gobitis was overruled on free speech grounds 
just three years later in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
642 (1943). The Court in Barnette specifically noted that “[i]t is not necessary to inquire 
whether non-conformist beliefs will exempt from the duty to salute unless we first find 
power to make the salute a legal duty.” Id. at 635. 
33  See JOHN WITTE, JR., & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 44, 46 (3d ed. 2011); John K. Wilson, Religion Under the 
State Constitutions, 1776-1800, 32 J. CHURCH & ST. 753, 755 (1990); McConnell, Origins, 
supra note 18, at 1456–58 (listing each clause). In addition, although Connecticut 
continued under its colonial charter, the legislature passed in 1776 “An Act containing an 
Abstract and Declaration of the Rights and Privileges of the People of this State, and 
securing the same.” ACTS AND LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, IN AMERICA 1 
(Timothy Green ed., 1784). The preamble mentions “civil and religious Rights and 
Liberties” and states that  
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canvassed these early state constitutional provisions, but reexamining 
these texts is a useful starting point for understanding founding-era 
views about religious liberty.34 
The constitution or bill of rights in most states during the Founding 
Era expressly mentioned that freedom of religion is an “unalienable 
right.”35 This reference to unalienable rights provides a critical insight 
                                                                                                                  
as the free Fruition of such Liberties and Privileges as Humanity, Civility and 
Christianity call for, as is due to every Man in his Place and Proportion, 
without Impeachment and Infringement, hath ever been, and will be the 
Tranquility and Stability of Churches and Commonwealths; and the Denial 
thereof, the Disturbance, if not the Ruin of both.  
Id. 
34  Judicial review was in its earliest stages during the 1780s. See William Michael 
Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN L. REV. 455, 474 (2005); Larry D. 
Kramer, Marbury and the Retreat from Judicial Supremacy, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 205, 215 
(2003). Therefore, state constitutional provisions may better elucidate what religious 
liberty meant rather than how it would be enforced. McConnell makes a similar point in an 
important footnote: “The exemptions of the colonial and revolutionary periods took place 
before the Constitution (even before the state constitutions) and before judicial review. The 
point of this preconstitutional history is to understand the experience against which the 
Framers and ratifiers would understand the proposed Amendment.” McConnell, Freedom 
from Persecution, supra note 20, at 838 n.112. McConnell acknowledges that early state 
constitutional protections may have been merely legislative guidelines, but he observes 
that “the Framers of the federal Bill of Rights, and particularly Madison, had completed 
the transition from hortatory declarations to judicially enforceable rights.” Id. 
35  See, e.g., DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 2, reprinted in 5 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 5 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“[A]ll men 
have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of 
their own consciences and understandings . . . .”); KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 3, 
reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER 
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 1264, 1274 (Francis Newton 
Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS] (“[A]ll men have a 
natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their 
own consciences . . . .”); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. V, reprinted in 4 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2453, 2454 (“Every individual has a natural and unalienable 
right to worship GOD according to the dictates of his own conscience, and reason . . . .”); 
N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra, at 2594, 2597 (recognizing “the inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God 
in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. 
XIX, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2787, 2788 (“[A]ll 
men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the 
dictates of their own consciences.”); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 3081, 3082 (“[A]ll men have a natural and 
unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own 
consciences and understanding . . . .”). Other states spoke of religious duties. See, e.g., MD. 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. XXXIII, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 1686, 1689 (“[I]t is the duty of every man to worship God in such 
manner as he thinks most acceptable to him . . . .”); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. II, reprinted in 
3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 1888, 1889 (“It is the right as well as 
the duty of all men . . . to worship the SUPREME BEING . . . .”); VA. CONST. of 1776, § 16, 
reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 3812, 3814 (“[R]eligion, 
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into how contemporaries understood religious liberty. Under Lockean 
social contract theory, individuals in a state of nature have certain 
natural rights. These rights include both alienable rights, which 
individuals may give up (or alienate) upon entering the social contract, 
and unalienable rights.36 According to James Madison, 
The Religion . . . of every man must be left to the conviction and 
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it 
as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable right. 
It is unalienable, because the opinions of men, depending only on the 
evidence contemplated by their own minds cannot follow the dictates 
of other men: It is unalienable also, because what is here a right 
towards men, is a duty towards the Creator.37   
Thus, Madison considered religious freedom to be unalienable because 
duties to God supersede worldly obligations. As shown in Part III, 
invocations of the inalienability of religious freedom were common in 
early constitutional debates. 
Viewing religious freedom as a natural and unalienable right aligns 
with the individual liberty view of free exercise. Governments do not 
exist in the state of nature, and therefore the meaning of natural rights 
cannot depend upon their relationship to governmental authorities.38 
Upon exiting the state of nature, however, individuals may forfeit most 
of their natural rights to the government, or they may redefine those 
rights in terms of governmental neutrality.39 But unalienable rights are 
different because, as Madison had explained with respect to free 
exercise, they cannot be given up or redefined.40 Suppose, for instance, 
that the right to self-defense is an unalienable right. Then suppose that 
the government passes a neutral law banning all intentional killings, 
irrespective of whether a person kills in self-defense. In this example, 
                                                                                                                  
or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed 
only by reason and conviction . . . .”). 
36  For one description of Lockean rights theory, see DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, 
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 87 (1989). 
37  James Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance (June 20, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON 298, 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973). 
38  See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8–9 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690); see also Richard Tuck, The Dangers of Natural Rights, 20 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 683, 691 (1997) (“Natural rights are obviously by definition meta-
political, though they may be adduced in discussion by legislators or interpreters of 
legislation . . . .”). 
39  For a useful and nuanced explanation of founding-era views on this issue, see 
Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE 
L.J. 907, 935–37 (1993) [hereinafter Hamburger, Natural Rights]. 
40  See Madison, supra note 37, at 299 (“This duty [to God] is precedent, both in 
order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. . . . We maintain 
therefore that in matters of Religion, no man’s right is abridged by the institution of Civil 
Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.”). 
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prosecuting someone for an intentional killing made in self-defense 
would plainly violate the individual, unalienable right to self-defense. 
The right predates and necessarily survives the social contract, and 
therefore the right’s definition and application do not depend on any 
feature of positive law, including a law’s neutrality or non-neutrality. 
Similarly, the Founders’ understanding of free exercise as an 
unalienable right strongly suggests that this right was individually held 
and not understood to be a guarantee of governmental neutrality.41  
Even in the state of nature, however, individuals cannot in the 
name of religious liberty infringe upon the rights of others. According to 
John Locke, the state of nature is “a state of perfect freedom . . . . yet it is 
not a state of licence.”42 Instead, it “has a law of nature to govern it, 
which obliges every one . . . that being all equal and independent, no one 
ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions . . . . ”43    
Early state constitutions mentioning the inalienability of religious 
freedom also recognized this fundamental limitation on religious 
liberty.44 In New Hampshire, for example, the constitution guaranteed 
the inalienability of free exercise for every person, “provided he doth not 
disturb the public peace, or disturb others, in their religious worship.”45 
Scholars dispute the meaning of these limiting provisions and 
particularly what it meant for someone to “disturb the peace.” 
Hamburger asserts that the founding generation considered all 
violations of law to be disruptions of the public peace.46 Therefore, he 
argues, limiting clauses in early religious-freedom provisions expressly 
                                                 
41  Of course, a society that forms a social contract may also recognize a religious 
neutrality norm. But that does not transform neutrality into an unalienable right, which in 
Lockean terms is a right that predates and necessarily survives the social contract. See 
LOCKE, supra note 38, at 13. 
42  Id. at 8–9. 
43  Id. at 9. Locke himself wrote in a time of Parliamentary sovereignty, thus 
making his views on the inalienability of religious rights slightly different than the views 
of the American founders. See McConnell, Origins, supra note 18, at 1435; see also 
McConnell, Freedom from Persecution, supra note 20, at 827–29 & n.47 (presenting a 
slightly different reading of Locke). 
44  Hamburger asserts that the inalienability of the rights of conscience proves that 
this right could not be conditioned, and then he uses the right’s supposed unconditionality 
to explain why it must have been highly circumscribed. Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 
VA. L. REV. 835, 847–57 (2004) [hereinafter Hamburger, More Is Less]. Saying that a right 
is unalienable, however, is quite different than saying that it is unconditional. In the 
Lockean state of nature, rights did not extend so far as to allow individuals to violate the 
rights of others. See LOCKE, supra note 38, at 9. Indeed, Hamburger has previously 
articulated a similar point. See Hamburger, Natural Rights, supra note 39, at 927–28.  
45  N.H. CONST., pt. 1, art. V, reprinted in 4 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 2453, 2454. 
46  Hamburger, Religious Exemption, supra note 19, at 918. 
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denied an individual right of religious exemption from neutral laws.47 In 
making this argument, however, Hamburger makes two critical 
mistakes. First, he assumes the point he is trying to prove. If exemptions 
were statutorily or constitutionally mandated, then judges who 
accommodated religious scruples would be following, not violating, the 
law. Indeed, military-service exemptions for Quakers were widely 
accepted rather than condemned as “lawless” or disruptive of the public 
peace.48  
More importantly, though, Hamburger overlooks the well-accepted 
eighteenth-century meaning of disruptions of the public peace.49 In his 
famous Commentaries on the Laws of England, for instance, William 
Blackstone listed thirteen “offenses against the public peace”—a list that 
did not include every civil and criminal law on the books.50 Similarly, the 
Articles of Confederation stated that “the members of Congress shall be 
protected in their persons from arrests and imprisonments, during the 
time of their going to and from, and attendance on Congress, except for 
treason, felony, or breach of the peace.”51 Of course, this protection from 
“arrests and imprisonments” would have been nugatory if the phrase 
“breaches of the peace” included any illegal act. An early dictionary the 
Supreme Court has used to establish the original public meaning of 
other constitutional provisions52 provides that “[a] violation of the public 
                                                 
47  Id. at 917–26. Hamburger states, “The behavior described by the caveats 
included more than just nonpeaceful behavior. . . . Whereas McConnell assumes that a 
disturbance of the peace was simply nonpeaceful behavior, eighteenth-century lawyers 
made clear that ‘every breach of law is against the peace.’” Id. at 918 (quoting Queen v. 
Lane, (1704) 87 Eng. Rep. 884 (Q.B.) 885; 6 Mod. 128, 128). Justice Scalia used this 
quotation in his concurring opinion in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 539 (1997) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
48  Hamburger’s own evidence in an early episode of controversy surrounding 
Quaker militia exemptions in the Revolutionary War largely supports this point. See Philip 
Hamburger, Religious Freedom in Philadelphia, 54 EMORY L.J. 1603, 1625 (2005) 
[hereinafter Hamburger, Religious Freedom]. To be sure, there were adamant denials that 
Quakers should be exempted and not have to pay an equivalent, but the overwhelming 
thrust of Hamburger’s evidence takes for granted the idea that militia exemptions for 
Quakers fall with the understood meaning of religious freedom. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Smith, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 107, 110 (1812) (discussing how Quakers were usually either 
exempted or excused from serving as grand jurors). 
49  The most thorough rebuttal of Hamburger’s position regarding disturbances of 
the peace appears in Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order 
Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine 
in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 280–300 (2002); see also 
McConnell, Freedom from Persecution, supra note 20, at 834–37. 
50  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 113–18 (Wayne Morrison ed., 2001). 
51  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. V (emphasis added). 
52  See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (relying on Noah 
Webster’s dictionary to define the term “witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause). 
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peace, as by a riot, affray, or any tumult which is contrary to law, and 
destructive to the public tranquility, is called a breach of the peace.”53  
Therefore, when state constitutions guaranteed the “unalienable 
rights of conscience,” except when individuals disturbed the public peace, 
these constitutional provisions recognized the basic idea of Lockean 
rights: Individuals may exercise their rights so long as they do not 
encroach upon the rights of others.  
This is not to say that neutrality was wholly unimportant. Many 
state constitutions also included clauses that contemplated limited forms 
of religious neutrality, particularly by circumscribing or renouncing 
state religious establishments.54 These provisions, however, were often 
in separate sections and generally did not affect the scope of free exercise 
protections.55 An interesting exception appears in the constitutions of 
New York and South Carolina, which declared that the “free exercise 
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without 
discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed, within 
this State, to all mankind . . . .”56 This provision may appear to be a 
straightforward endorsement of governmental neutrality. A closer 
reading, however, reveals that the modifier “without discrimination or 
preference” applies to the phrase “free exercise and enjoyment of 
religious profession and worship” and not to the enactment of laws 
generally.57 In other words, the right of free exercise had to be respected 
                                                 
53  NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (photo. 
reprint 2005) (1828). 
54  See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 3, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 3092, 3100 (providing that “no preference shall ever be 
given, by law, to any religious establishments or modes of worship”). Even Massachusetts, 
which had an official religious establishment, also had a constitutional guarantee that 
every Christian sect was under the equal protection of the law. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. III, 
reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 1888, 1890 (“And 
every denomination of Christians, demeaning themselves peaceably, and as good subjects 
of the commonwealth, shall be equally under the protection of the law: and no 
subordination of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by 
law.”). 
55  See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 4, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 3092, 3100 (“[N]o person, who acknowledges the being of 
a God and a future state of rewards and punishments, shall, on account of his religious 
sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place of trust or profit under this 
commonwealth”); id. § 3 (“[N]o preference shall ever be given, by law, to any religious 
establishments or modes of worship.”).  
56  N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 2623, 2637 (emphasis added); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. 
VIII, § 1, reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 3258, 
3264 (emphasis added). 
57  If one took a strict view of neutrality, it would be difficult to see how religious 
exemptions themselves would not constitute a “discrimination or preference.” Yet “there is 
virtually no evidence that anyone thought [regulatory religious exemptions] were 
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equally, but this did not prevent the government from treating certain 
religious groups differently than others in ways that did not infringe 
upon that right.58  
Given the modern primacy of governmental neutrality with respect 
to religious beliefs, it is easy to view the individual liberty approach to 
free exercise as expansive or even radical. According to Hamburger, 
“most eighteenth-century advocates of religious liberty sought a freedom 
from laws that imposed constraints on the basis of religion (or at least 
religious differences), [but] numerous modern advocates and judges 
expect more. . . . They thereby adopt a very expansive definition of the 
First Amendment’s right of free exercise.”59 Applied to our modern 
circumstances, the scope of the individual liberty approach may, in fact, 
be expansive. The Supreme Court currently considers the neutrality 
theory as a baseline,60 so mandatory exemptions would increase the 
scope of free exercise, based on the current doctrine.  
In the eighteenth century, however, religious exemptions were 
highly non-radical. As William Marshall has mentioned, “[T]here [were] 
few religiously neutral state provisions with which the religious 
practices could have been in conflict. The regulatory state did not 
exist.”61 Moreover, “[T]he culture of the United States in the late 
eighteenth century was fairly homogeneous, being composed almost 
entirely of Christian sects whose practices were unlikely to violate non-
                                                                                                                  
constitutionally prohibited or that they were part of an establishment of religion.” Douglas 
Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original Understanding of 
the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1796 (2006). 
58  Thus, when the New York Constitutional Ratification Convention proposed in 
1788 that “the People have an equal, natural and unalienable right, freely and peaceably to 
Exercise their Religion according to the dictates of Conscience, and that no Religious Sect 
or Society ought to be favoured or established by Law in preference of others,” the equal 
right to free exercise meant that the right existed regardless of a person’s religion, not that 
all religions had to be treated equally under the law. Ratification of the Constitution by the 
State of New York (July 26, 1788), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 191 (Dep’t of State ed., 1894). Similar language appeared 
in Virginia’s 1776 Bill of Rights, which proclaimed that “religion, or the duty which we owe 
to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and 
conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free 
exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience . . . .” VA. CONST. of 1776, § 16, 
reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 3812, 3814 
(emphasis added). 
59  Hamburger, More Is Less, supra note 44, at 836 (emphasis added). Hamburger, 
however, argues that state free exercise clauses were generally even more limited, applying 
only to state-imposed prohibitions on religious practices rather than any religious 
classification. Id. at 841. 
60  See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
61  William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free 
Exercise Exemption, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 363, 382 (1989). 
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religious societal norms.”62 In some notable instances, neutral laws did 
conflict with individual liberty. Quakers, for example, had conscientious 
scruples against swearing oaths and serving in the military.63 Faced 
with this dilemma, however, states readily granted religious 
accommodations throughout the first decades of the young republic, 
apparently with little social cost.64 In addition to the rarity of conflicts 
between individual religious scruples and neutral laws, several 
important backstops prevented conscientious-objection claims from 
destabilizing the legal regime. Prevailing religious norms still placed a 
high premium on conformity to church doctrine, and the government 
generally recognized only those conscientious objections shared by an 
entire denomination.65 Therefore, guaranteeing religious exemptions as a 
constitutional principle did not mean a free-for-all in practice, where any 
individual could claim and receive exemptions on a whim.66 Additionally, 
as it had in the state of nature, religious liberty did not permit 
individuals to interfere with the rights of others, thus giving states yet 
another means of limiting exemptions.67  
De facto limits on religious exemptions help explain why the 
Federal Free Exercise Clause received such little debate. Recently, 
Nicholas Rosenkranz argued that the First Amendment’s famous 
opening phrase, “Congress shall make no law,” implies that the Free 
Exercise Clause prevents facially discriminatory laws but does not 
provide an individual right to conscientious exemption.68 In his initial 
remarks on the clause, however, James Madison suggested a different 
reason why the First Amendment only mentions Congress: 
Whether the words [of the amendment] are necessary or not, he did 
not mean to say, but they had been required by some of the State 
Conventions, who seemed to entertain an opinion that under the 
clause of the constitution, which gave power to Congress to make all 
laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the Constitution, 
and the laws made under it, enabled them to make laws of such a 
                                                 
62  Id. at 383. 
63  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 107, 110 (1812); see also 
Hamburger, Religious Freedom, supra note 48, at 1625.  
64  See McConnell, Origins, supra note 18, at 1466–73 (discussing common 
eighteenth-century exemptions); see also infra note 89. 
65  McConnell, Origins, supra note 18, at 1472. 
66  See Campbell, supra note 20, at 978–79. 
67  See McConnell, Freedom from Persecution, supra note 20, at 845–46. 
68  Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1209, 1263, 1266–68 (2010). Other textually-based critiques of the individual-liberty view 
focus on the word “prohibiting.” See, e.g., Allan Ides, The Text of the Free Exercise Clause as 
a Measure of Employment Division v. Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 51 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 135, 147–51 (1994). But see McConnell, Origins, supra note 18, at 
1486–88 (responding to the argument that the word “prohibiting” mediates against the 
individual liberty view of free exercise). 
 REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:311 326 
nature as might infringe the rights of conscience, and establish a 
national religion; to prevent these effects he presumed the amendment 
was intended, and he thought it as well expressed as the nature of the 
language would admit.69 
If Madison’s views are representative, specifying that Congress shall not 
prohibit the free exercise of religion was an antidote to lingering concern 
about the Necessary and Proper Clause. It was not a subtle repudiation 
of the inalienability of religious freedom.  
Indeed, evidence from the drafting of the First Amendment belies 
the idea that the First Congress recognized something other than the 
prevailing concept of religious freedom. On August 15, 1789, for 
instance, some delegates expressed concern over whether the text of the 
current draft—“no religion shall be established by law, nor shall the 
equal rights of conscience be infringed”—could be misconstrued to 
prohibit state establishments or even church bylaws.70 Responding to 
this objection, Samuel Livermore proposed an alternative: “Congress 
shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of 
conscience.”71 Daniel Carroll remarked that he “would not contend with 
gentlemen about the phraseology,” but rather wanted “to secure the 
substance in such a manner as to satisfy the wishes of the honest part of 
the community.”72 Indeed, the delegates were not debating the meaning 
of free exercise at all. Rather, they were trying to ensure that the text of 
the Establishment Clause would not be construed to interfere with state 
laws or church bylaws. Modern legal scholars who use hyper-technical 
textual readings to interpret the Free Exercise Clause are simply 
missing the point. The use of words like “Congress” or “prohibiting” in 
the Free Exercise Clause had nothing to do with how contemporaries 
would have understood the substance of the right itself. 
Yet Madison’s musings about whether the Free Exercise Clause was 
even necessary are also quite revealing. Indeed, in the eighteenth-
century context, it was hard to imagine how Congress could possibly 
have interfered with an individual’s free exercise of religion. Other 
provisions of the Constitution precluded federal interference with 
religious liberty by allowing affirmations instead of oaths and by 
granting states, rather than Congress, control over militia attendance 
laws.73 Other than these well-known areas, there were scarcely other 
                                                 
69  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
70  Id. 
71  Id. at 731. 
72  Id. at 730. 
73  U.S. CONST. art. VI (“[A]ll executive and judicial Officers, both of the United 
States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this 
Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or 
public Trust under the United States.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (“[R]eserving to the 
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ways federal laws could have burdened free exercise.74  
Many founding-era laws, however, drew distinctions on the basis of 
religion, thus defying incipient notions of religious neutrality. For 
instance, most states used religious distinctions to prevent some 
individuals from serving as legislators or as courtroom witnesses.75 
Blasphemy prosecutions and religious assessment laws also conflicted 
with religious neutrality.76 Although largely overlooked, the 
controversies surrounding these laws demonstrate that in eighteenth-
century and early nineteenth-century terms, contrary to our modern 
understanding, religious neutrality was the far more radical and 
expansive theory of religious freedom. 
III. EARLY DEBATES OVER NEUTRALITY 
Almost all historical examinations of religious freedom concentrate 
on early exemption decisions without also considering neutrality cases.77 
Despite this modern scholarly imbalance, nineteenth-century neutrality 
cases were far more prevalent than exemption cases. The most common 
controversies involved the constitutionality of testimonial exclusions, 
test oaths, blasphemy laws, and religious assessments. Participants in 
early debates about religious neutrality repeatedly referred to the 
individual liberty theory as the core, and often the extent, of 
constitutionally protected religious liberty. Gradually, however, 
Americans in the first half of the nineteenth century embraced a more 
inclusive vision of religious freedom that included wider protections of 
governmental neutrality.  
A. Testimonial Exclusions 
In the late eighteenth century, oaths were explicitly religious. 
Swearing on the Bible or another religious book constituted an 
                                                                                                                  
States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the 
Militia . . . .”). Before the First Amendment was ratified, the House of Representatives 
passed a bill granting Quakers exemptions from militia service, though the Senate 
apparently rejected this language. See Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the 
Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
1083, 1085–86 (2008) (arguing that the First Congress did not agree to exemptions). 
Federal law, however, did not reject exemptions. See id. at 1120. It merely left the issue to 
be decided by state governments.  
74  Another area of nineteenth-century litigation concerned whether Jews were 
exempt from serving as jurors or witnesses on Saturday. See, e.g., Philips v. Gratz, 2 Pen. 
& W. 412, 412 (Pa. 1831); Stansbury v. Marks, 2 Dall. 213, 213 (Pa. 1793). I have not 
discovered any such conflicts in federal court. 
75  See infra Parts III.A–B. 
76  See infra Parts III.C–D. 
77  See, e.g., McConnell, Origins, supra note 18, at 1503. But see Bradley, supra note 
19, at 272–77 (discussing testimonial exclusion and blasphemy cases, though arguing that 
these cases did not involve laws targeting religion). 
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invocation of divine punishment against perjury.78 Originally at common 
law, only Christians were allowed to swear under oath.79 During the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, English courts slowly 
allowed exceptions to the strict common-law rule, primarily to allow 
testimony from Jewish merchants.80 The result of this transition was the 
general rule announced by Lord Chief Justice John Willes in Omychund 
v. Barker that swearing an oath required belief in God and belief in 
hell.81 According to Lord Chief Justice Willes, any persons “who believe 
[in] God, and future rewards and punishments in the other world, may 
be witnesses; yet I am as clearly of opinion, that if they do not believe 
[in] God, or future rewards and punishments, they ought not to be 
admitted as witnesses.”82 While the rule allowed most non-Christians to 
swear oaths, it still required certain religious beliefs. As George 
Washington asked rhetorically in his 1796 Farewell Address, “[W]here is 
the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious 
obligation desert the oaths, which are the instruments of investigation in 
Courts of Justice?”83  
Quakers as well as certain other Christians believed in God and 
future rewards and punishments, which normally would have been 
sufficient to allow them to testify, but they famously refused to swear 
oaths because of their literal interpretation of the biblical injunction: 
“Swear not at all . . . .”84 This refusal to swear oaths because of 
conscientious scruples brought the common-law rule into conflict with 
religious beliefs and not only left those Christians unable to serve as 
witnesses or jurors but also left them susceptible to contempt charges for 
refusing to fulfill their legal obligations in response to subpoenas and 
jury summonses.85 This had the potential to place effective criminal 
sanctions on certain religious beliefs.86 In response, colonial and state 
                                                 
78  See Curtiss v. Strong, 4 Day 51, 55–56 (Conn. 1809).  
79  See B.H. Hartogensis, Denial of Equal Rights to Religious Minorities and Non-
Believers in the United States, 39 YALE L.J. 659, 661 & n.12 (1930). 
80  Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch.) 30; 1 Atk. 21, 44 (Lord Willes, 
C.J.). 
81  Id. at 31; 1 Atk. at 45. 
82  Id. In a later report of the Omychund decision, supposedly based on Willes’s 
original manuscripts, Willes was reported to have said that a person may be admitted if he 
“believes a God and that he will reward and punish him in this world, but does not believe 
a future state . . . .” Omichund v. Barker, (1744) Willes 538 (Ch.) 550 (Lord Willes C.J.). 
83  35 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 229 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940). 
84  Matthew 5:34 (King James). 
85  E.g., Bryan’s Case, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch) 151, 151 (C.C. 1804) (holding a juror, who 
was a member of the Methodist denomination, in contempt for refusing to swear); 
M’Intire’s Case, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch) 157, 157 (C.C. 1803) (holding a juror in contempt for 
refusing to swear). 
86  See Bryan’s Case, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch) at 151.  
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governments passed laws allowing affirmations instead of oaths from 
Quakers and members of other sects known to have religious scruples.87 
According to Connecticut Supreme Court Justice Zephaniah Swift, 
There is no appeal to God in an affirmation. It is merely a 
declaration that the affirmant will speak the truth, upon the pains 
and penalties of perjury: yet, there is no question but that Quakers 
pay as much regard to the truth under an affirmation, as other 
denominations of christians under an oath, and are entitled to as 
much credit.88 
And in those states that did not authorize affirmations in lieu of oaths, 
Quakers and other religious objectors received routine exemptions from 
serving as jurors or witnesses.89 The near universality of these 
exemptions shows that state laws were, at a minimum, consistent with 
an individual liberty theory of religious freedom. 
Oaths themselves, however, remained explicitly religious and were 
therefore incongruous with a neutrality-based understanding of religious 
freedom. In one of the first reported challenges to the common-law 
incompetency rule, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors reaffirmed 
the necessity of religious qualifications:  
Every person who does not believe in the obligation of an oath, and a 
future state of rewards and punishments, or any accountability after 
death for his conduct, is by law excluded from being a witness; for to 
such a person the law presumes no credit is to be given. Testimony is 
not to be received from any person in a court of justice, but under the 
sanction of an oath. It would therefore be idle to administer an oath to 
a man who disregards its obligation. . . . [T]he fear of offending God 
should have its influence upon a witness to induce him to speak the 
truth. But no such influence can be expected from the man who 
disregards an oath.90 
                                                 
87  See McConnell, Origins, supra note 18, at 1467–68. 
88  ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
CASES 51 (photo. reprint 1972) (1810). 
89  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 107, 110 (1812) (“Before the 
recent statute . . . Quakers, and persons scrupulous of taking judicial oaths, were either 
exempted or excused from serving on the grand jury . . . .”); see also Philips v. Gratz, 2 Pen. 
& W. 412, 416 (Pa. 1831) (“The religious scruples of persons concerned with the 
administration of justice will receive all the indulgence that is compatible with the 
business of government; and had circumstances permitted it, this cause would not have 
been ordered for trial on the Jewish Sabbath.”); Guardians of the Poor v. Greene, 5 Binn. 
554, 562 (Pa. 1813) (“[P]ublic ministers of all denominations returned as jurors, have 
uniformly been excused by the Court on their application.”); State v. Willson, 13 S.C.L. (2 
McCord) 393, 396 (1823) (mentioning “certain instances of individuals being excused” from 
jury duty because of conscientious scruples). 
90  Curtiss v. Strong, 4 Day 51, 55–56 (Conn. 1809); see also State v. Cooper, 2 Tenn. 
(2 Overt.) 96, 96 (1807) (Campbell, J.) (finding that “no man who did not believe in a future 
state of existence, rewards and punishments, could be a witness”); Important Judicial 
Decision, 1 AM. MONTHLY MAG. & CRITICAL REV. 64, 65 (1817) (reporting that Chief Justice 
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Witness competency rules were not meant as a form of punishment for 
those who disbelieved in God or future punishment. Nevertheless, the 
common-law incompetency rule explicitly discriminated between 
individuals on the basis of religious belief.91 
In Jackson, ex dem. Tuttle v. Gridley, the highest appellate court in 
New York heard a novel challenge to the common-law oath 
requirements.92 A trial judge advised the jury to disregard an avowed 
atheist’s testimony because the atheist purportedly lacked the beliefs 
necessary to feel bound by an oath.93 On appeal, the party offering the 
witness’s testimony argued that the State’s constitutional guarantee of 
religious freedom had abrogated common-law exclusions based on 
religious belief.94 Chief Justice Ambrose Spencer replied, 
 Religion is a subject on which every man has a right to think 
according to the dictates of his understanding. It is a solemn concern 
between his conscience and his God, with which no human tribunal 
has a right to meddle. But in the development of facts, and the 
ascertainment of truth, human tribunals have a right to interfere. 
They are bound to see that no man’s rights are impaired or taken 
away, but through the medium of testimony entitled to belief; and no 
testimony is entitled to credit, unless delivered under the solemnity of 
an oath, which comes home to the conscience of the witness, and will 
create a tie arising from his belief that false swearing would expose 
him to punishment in the life to come. On this great principle rest all 
our institutions, and especially the distribution of justice between man 
and man.95 
At first glance, Spencer seems to have articulated a compelling 
governmental interest for discriminating on the basis of religious belief. 
Indeed, protection of other rights was a well-accepted justification for 
allowing infringements upon religious liberty.96 On a closer reading, 
though, Spencer seems mostly concerned with the act of investigating a 
witness’s religious views, not with any subsequent discrimination on the 
basis of those views.97 According to Spencer, religious beliefs are a 
                                                                                                                  
John Louis Taylor of North Carolina had recently excluded a witness who professed 
disbelief in “either a heaven or a hell”). 
91  Accord Bradley, supra note 19, at 274–75. 
92  Jackson, ex dem. Tuttle v. Gridley, 18 Johns. 98, 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820). 
93  Amos Gridley, the contested witness, had allegedly denied belief in God, though 
he stated shortly before the trial that “he had formerly embraced the principles of the 
Universalists, and rather believed it was right.” Id. at 99. 
94  Id. at 101, 103. 
95  Id. at 106. 
96  See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text; McConnell, Freedom from 
Persecution, supra note 20, at 845–46. 
97  Gridley, 18 Johns. at 104 (“[T]he most religious witness may be scandalized by 
the imputation which the very question implies.”). 
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“solemn concern between [a man’s] conscience and his God.”98 Yet 
government had a right to “meddle” or “interfere” with religious privacy 
when there was sufficient doubt about a person’s religious fitness to 
testify in court.99 In other words, Spencer’s focus was on the rights of the 
individual, not a fear of governmental discrimination. Indeed, when a 
prospective witness’s religious qualifications were in doubt, the 
prevailing method of ascertaining those beliefs was hearsay evidence 
rather than direct questioning because the latter was thought to 
interfere with a person’s freedom of conscience.100 As Judge Swift wrote 
in his widely distributed evidence treatise, “A man’s opinions are 
matters between himself and his God, so long as he does not disclose 
them, and it is wholly inconsistent with the rights of conscience, to 
compel him to do it.”101 
Although some courts allowed testimony from witnesses who did not 
believe in future punishment,102 courts generally rejected arguments 
based on religious liberty. In Atwood v. Welton, for example, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court reexamined its holding from Curtiss v. 
Strong,103 which affirmed the common-law incompetency rule.104 This 
time, however, an attorney raised a constitutional objection to the 
process of excluding witnesses based on their religious beliefs.105 The 
court acknowledged that “a man ought not to be [directly] questioned 
respecting his religious opinions,” but it upheld the constitutionality of 
testimonial exclusions when hearsay evidence proved that a prospective 
witness did not believe in God or future rewards and punishments.106 
The court declared,  
The plain meaning of these [constitutional] provisions, is to secure an 
entire freedom in religious profession and worship and an entire 
exclusion by law of any preference to any sect or mode of worship. No 
man shall be prohibited from professing what religion he pleases, or 
                                                 
98  Id. at 106. 
99  Id. 
100  See SWIFT, supra note 88, at 18.  
101  Id. 
102  These courts usually did not articulate reasons why such witnesses should be 
admitted contrary to the common-law rule. See, e.g., Hunscom v. Hunscom, 15 Mass. (14 
Tyng) 184, 184 (1818) (allowing a witness who “professed disbelief of a future state of 
existence” to be sworn in); cf. Noble v. People, 1 Ill. (Breese) 54, 55–56 (1822) (admitting 
witness who did not believe in future punishments but believed in God and a future state). 
Some courts based their decisions on different understandings of the common law rather 
than constitutional arguments about religious liberty. See, e.g., People v. Matteson, 2 Cow. 
433, 434–35 (N.Y. Oyer & Terminer 1824). 
103  Curtiss v. Strong, 4 Day 51, 55–56 (Conn. 1809). 
104  Atwood v. Welton, 7 Day 66, 82 (Conn. 1828). 
105  Id. at 68, 77. 
106  Id. at 73–74. 
 REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:311 332 
worshipping in any manner he pleases; nor shall there be any religious 
establishment, or approximation towards it, by any law giving any 
preference to any sect or mode of worship.107   
“But,” the court asked rhetorically, “cannot a person be free in his 
profession and worship, who is excluded from giving testimony, on the 
ground of his denial of all liability to future punishment? How does his 
exclusion affect his belief, profession or mode of worship? It has no 
possible bearing on either.”108 In other words, religious freedom is 
infringed upon only if a law “affects” a person’s “belief, profession, or 
mode of worship,” not when a law discriminates between individuals on 
the basis of their religious beliefs. 
Excluding witnesses because of disqualifying religious beliefs was 
widespread and well-accepted at the founding, but by the late 1820s, it 
was becoming increasingly disfavored. In 1827, a chancery decision in 
South Carolina articulated the emerging neutrality-based argument for 
overturning the common-law rule.109 The case involved the competency of 
a witness who denied the possibility of divine punishment after death.110 
Counsel in support of the witness argued that excluding him would 
contravene South Carolina’s free exercise clause.111 Opposing counsel 
responded, “[T]he inquiry into [the witness’s] religious opinions did not 
contravene . . . the Constitution [because] he might still enjoy his 
religious profession, and worship notwithstanding such exclusion, 
and . . . the exclusion would merely operate on his civil and not his 
religious rights.”112   
In deciding the case, Chancellor Henry William DeSaussure 
interpreted the common law as allowing the witness to testify.113 In 
addition, DeSaussure expounded upon his understanding that the state 
constitution prohibited the government from placing religious 
restrictions on an individual’s enjoyment of civil rights: 
If a man’s religious opinions are made a ground to exclude him from 
the enjoyment of civil rights, then he does not enjoy the freedom of his 
religious profession and worship. His exclusion from being a witness in 
Courts of Justice is a serious injury to him; it is also degrading to him 
and others who think with him. If men may be excluded for their 
religious opinions, from being witnesses, they may be excluded from 
being Jurors or Judges; and the Legislature might enact a law 
excluding such persons from holding any other office, or serving in the 
Legislature, or becoming teachers of schools, or professors of colleges. 
                                                 
107  Id. at 77. 
108  Id. at 78. 
109  Farnandis v. Henderson, 1 CAROLINA L.J. 202 (1831) (S.C. Ch. Ct. 1827). 
110  Id. at 202–03.  
111  Id. at 211. 
112  Id. at 212. 
113  Id. at 210–11. 
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In my judgment this would be in the very teeth of the Constitution, 
and would violate the spirit of all our institutions. . . . It would seem to 
me to be a mockery to say to men, you may enjoy the freedom of your 
religious professions and worship; but if you differ from us in certain 
dogmas and points of belief, you shall be disqualified and deprived of 
the rights of a citizen, to which you would be entitled but for those 
differences of religious opinion.114 
DeSaussure’s eloquent decision was at the vanguard of a neutrality-
based view of religious liberty and expresses a view similar to modern 
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine.115 His opinion illustrates a growing 
yet still contested notion that the government should not discriminate on 
the basis of religious belief.116 Religious freedom, however, remained first 
and foremost an individual liberty concern.117 The concept of religious 
liberty was gradually expanding beyond—but not yet displacing—its 
individual liberty core.  
B. Religious Tests 
In addition to imposing religious requirements for testifying in 
court, several states also placed religious tests for officeholders into their 
constitutions.118 Debates over these provisions often paralleled the 
                                                 
114  Id. at 212. 
115  The connection between a constitutional requirement of neutrality and the 
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine is well-recognized in existing scholarship. See, e.g., 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1490 (1989) 
(“[A]n unconstitutional condition can skew the distribution of constitutional rights among 
rightholders because it necessarily discriminates facially between those who do and those 
who do not comply with the condition. If government has an obligation of evenhandedness 
or neutrality with regard to a right, this sort of redistribution is inappropriate.”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with 
Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 616 (1990) (“If 
the relevant constitutional provision requires neutrality, consideration of conscientious 
objections is probably illegitimate and, in any case, insufficiently weighty to justify 
selective decisionmaking. A decision to fund Christian but not Jewish art, or paintings 
favorable to Republicans, would be plainly unconstitutional.”). 
116  The next reported decision that cited constitutional grounds for overturning 
common-law exclusions came almost twenty years later in Perry v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. 
(3 Gratt.) 645, 654–55 (1846) (stating that Virginia’s Bill of Rights abrogated the common-
law exclusion rule). Judges could also use other arguments to allow religious groups like 
Universalists to testify, and many legislatures took steps to ensure that courts did not 
discriminate on religious grounds. See Ronald P. Formisano & Stephen Pickering, The 
Christian Nation Debate and Witness Competency, 29 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 219, 227, 232–33 
(2009); Thomas Raeburn White, Oaths in Judicial Proceedings and Their Effect upon the 
Competency of Witnesses, 51 AM. L. REG. 373, 392–93 & n.39 (1903). 
117  See McConnell, Origins, supra note 18, at 1446. 
118  The five states with test oath provisions in their constitutions in 1789 were 
Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. DEL. CONST. OF 
1776, art. XXII, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 
562, 566; MD. CONST. of 1776, art. LV, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 1686, 1700; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. VI, art. I, reprinted 
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arguments made in the context of witness exclusions. Contemporaries 
occasionally understood these provisions as infringements on the rights 
of conscience.119 Generally, however, public comments reflected an 
emphasis on individual liberty rather than governmental neutrality. 
In arguing that test oaths violated the rights of conscience, some 
people framed their critiques in terms of individual liberty. Jewish 
leader Jonas Phillips, for example, pleaded in a petition to the 1787 
Philadelphia Convention that “to swear and believe [in certain Christian 
tenets] is absolutly [sic] against the religious principle of a Jew[] and [it] 
is against his Conscience to take any such oath.”120 Constitutional 
Framer and future Supreme Court Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth 
articulated his opposition to test oaths in slightly different terms: 
[T]he sole purpose and effect of [the Federal Constitution’s No 
Religious Test Oath Clause] is to exclude persecution, and to secure to 
[the people] the important right of religious liberty. We are almost the 
only people in the world, who have a full enjoyment of this important 
right of human nature. In our country every man has a right to 
worship God in that way which is most agreeable to his own 
conscience. If he be a good and peaceable citizen, he is liable to no 
penalties or incapacities on account of his religious sentiments; or in 
other words, he is not subject to persecution.  
. . . . 
. . . A test-law is the parent of hypocrisy, and the offspring of error 
and the spirit of persecution. Legislatures have no right to set up an 
inquisition, and examine into the private opinions of men.121  
In this passage, Ellsworth advocates for governmental neutrality, but he 
frames this argument in terms of individual liberty, not in terms of a 
right to equal treatment. According to Ellsworth, excluding people from 
the legislature was a type of “penalty or incapacity,” thus punishing 
particular religious convictions.122 Moreover, like Judge Spencer later 
recognized in Jackson, ex dem. Tuttle v. Gridley, Ellsworth thought test 
                                                                                                                  
in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 1888, 1908; N.C. CONST. of 
1776, art. XXXII, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 
2787, 2793; PA. CONST. of 1776, § 10, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 3081, 3085. The Federal Constitution bans federal test 
oaths. U.S. CONST. art. VI (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to 
any Office or public Trust under the United States.”). 
119  See, e.g., Letter from Jonas Phillips to President and Members of the Convention 
(Sept. 7, 1787), in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 638 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner 
eds., 2000).  
120  Id. 
121  Oliver Ellsworth, “A Landholder” VII, CONN. COURANT, Dec. 17, 1787, reprinted 
in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, 
ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 521, 522, 525 (Bernard 
Bailyn ed., 1993).  
122  See id. at 522–23. 
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oaths constituted a governmental inquisition into religious beliefs and 
therefore interfered with the individual right of conscience.123 
Discussions at the 1820 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention 
illustrate the arguments made in support of religious tests. At that time, 
Massachusetts still had various non-neutral laws. The state collected 
special religious taxes to support local pastors,124 and it required many 
state officeholders to swear the following: “I believe the Christian 
religion, and have a firm persuasion of its truth . . . .”125 As the delegates 
congregated in 1820, some wanted the convention to reconsider the 
religious test oath required of all public officials.126 In pursuit of this 
goal, reformers such as James Prince often invoked religious freedom. In 
one of the most detailed attacks on religious tests, Prince explained, 
There are . . . two distinct rights belonging to man—UNALIENABLE and 
NATURAL—among those of the first class are the rights of conscience in 
all matters of religion. . . . [A]s man owes supreme allegiance to God, 
as the Creator, and as the undivided governor of the universe, he 
cannot absolve himself, nor can others absolve him from this supreme 
allegiance; and hence, on entering into a social compact, the rights he 
gives up, and the powers he delegates must be tributary to, and in 
subordination to this high and first allegiance . . . .127 
Because religious duties are supreme, and because governmental 
authority is subordinate to those duties, Prince then concluded that “on 
entering into the social compact, every man has a right to enter on equal 
terms; but, if the consciences of men are in any wise shackled by forms or 
qualifications, this would not be the case.”128 Therefore, according to 
Prince, inequality in the treatment of different religions violates the 
basic terms of the social contract. Notably, Prince was not opposing an 
individual liberty view of religious freedom. Instead, much like 
Ellsworth, he explicitly used an individual liberty framework to justify 
governmental neutrality. According to Prince, the government could not 
                                                 
123  Jackson, ex dem. Tuttle v. Gridley, 18 Johns. 98, 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820); 
Ellsworth, supra note 121, at 525; cf. Note, An Originalist Analysis of the No Religious Test 
Clause, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1649, 1658 (2007) (arguing that the No Religious Test Oath 
Clause prohibits only test oaths not religious qualifications for office). While plausible (and 
supportive of the thesis of this Article), this latter argument probably takes the text of the 
Clause too literally.   
124  See infra Part III.D. 
125  MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. VI, art. I, repealed by MASS. CONST. amend. art. VII, 
reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 1888, 1908. 
126  BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE 
CONVENTION OF DELEGATES CHOSEN TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS 83 
(1821). 
127  Id. at 84. 
128  Id. at 85 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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place conditions on the exercise of political privileges because doing so 
would “shackle” or punish minority religious beliefs.129   
Delegates in the Massachusetts convention universally agreed that 
religious freedom was an unalienable right, yet most speakers rejected 
Prince’s conclusion about test oaths. In a lengthy floor speech, future 
Senator Daniel Webster stated that “[n]othing is more unfounded than 
the notion that any man has a right to an office. . . . This qualification 
has nothing to do with any man’s conscience. If he dislikes the condition, 
he may decline the office . . . .”130 Many delegates opposed religious tests 
for policy reasons but denied that test oaths interfered with freedom of 
conscience.131 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Justice Samuel S. 
Wilde, for instance, argued against the propriety of religious tests but 
noted that they “d[o] not interfere with the rights of conscience.—No 
person has any conscience about becoming a Legislator. He is not obliged 
to accept of office, and he has no right to claim it.”132  
Webster and Wilde made two points in these speeches. First, an 
opportunity to become a public official was not a right of citizenship, and 
therefore, test oaths did not infringe upon political or civil rights. 
Second, Webster and Wilde explained that no individual has a religious 
duty to serve in public office. Thus, because the law did not interfere 
with anyone’s religious duties, it also did not interfere with the right of 
conscience. The obvious assumption in Webster’s and Wilde’s remarks is 
that a law can infringe upon religious freedom only if it interferes with 
an individual’s worship or conscience. 
In the end, the delegates decided by a vote of 242 to 176 to omit 
religious tests for office.133 While this vote reflects a trend toward 
separating governmental and religious concerns, the preceding debates 
illustrate the priorities implicit in the delegates’ understandings of 
religious freedom. The prevailing view seems to have been that religious 
                                                 
129  See id. at 85–86. 
130  Id. at 83–84; see also id. at 88 (remarks of Samuel Hubbard) (“The right to be 
elected to office was not an unalienable right. It affected neither a man’s life, liberty nor 
conscience.”). 
131  See, e.g., id. at 91 (remarks of Thomas Baldwin) (arguing that tests did not 
violate religious freedom but were nonetheless dubious on policy grounds); id. at 93 
(remarks of Lovell Walker) (“Admitting that we have the right to demand [religious 
tests]—he doubted the expediency of it.”). Samuel A. Welles agreed that a religious test 
oath was unwise as a policy matter, but he observed that the religious neutrality 
proponents were not being internally consistent: 
[F]or if it be an interference in the right of conscience, to require that persons 
who may be chosen by the people to certain offices, shall swear to their belief in 
the christian religion, it must also be an interference in the right of conscience, 
to require that they shall swear by the name of God himself . . . . 
Id. at 89. 
132  Id. at 90. 
133  Id. at 94. 
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tests did not infringe upon the individual right of conscience; therefore, 
such tests should be considered in terms of their practicality, not 
whether they interfered with unalienable rights. The delegates were not 
debating exemptions,134 but their arguments seem to endorse the 
individual liberty theory of religious freedom.  
C. Blasphemy Prosecutions 
Blasphemy—or “open and malicious . . . reviling of God or 
Scripture”—was punishable at common law as a breach of the peace.135 
As one judge wrote in 1838, the crime of blasphemy was “not intended to 
prevent or restrain the formation of any opinions or the profession of any 
religious sentiments whatever, but to restrain and punish acts which 
have a tendency to disturb the public peace.”136 Defendants in several 
nineteenth-century blasphemy cases, however, argued that 
constitutionally guaranteed religious liberty protected their religious 
expressions—even when blasphemous.137 The constitutional arguments 
in these cases were slightly different than those involved in oath cases. 
First, unlike an exclusion from legislative service, those convicted of 
blasphemy suffered criminal punishment. Moreover, test oaths and 
testimonial exclusions focused on an individual’s underlying beliefs, 
whereas blasphemy prosecutions were based on an overt act. 
Nonetheless, similar religious freedom arguments appear in blasphemy 
cases. The responses to these arguments yet again reveal a marked 
                                                 
134  Interestingly, a few delegates did oppose religious tests because occasionally 
religious tests did interfere with conscience. Daniel Webster, for instance, stated,  
It has been said that there are many very devout and serious persons—persons 
who esteem the Christian religion to be above all price—to whom, nevertheless, 
the terms of this declaration seem somewhat too strong and intense. They 
seem, to these persons, to require the declaration of that faith which is deemed 
essential to personal salvation . . . . There may, however, and there appears to 
be, conscience in this objection; and all conscience ought to be respected. I was 
not aware, before I attended the discussions in the committee, of the extent to 
which this objection prevailed. 
Id. at 84. Josiah Hussey noted that Quakers could not swear to oaths and were therefore 
excluded as legislators. Therefore, he proposed allowing “any other person who cannot by 
the principles of his religious faith take an oath” to still serve as a representative. Id. at 86 
(internal quotation marks omitted). These points typically came without further 
discussion, and therefore it is unclear how widely other delegates shared these sentiments.   
135  See Sarah Barringer Gordon, Blasphemy and the Law of Religious Liberty in 
Nineteenth-Century America, 52 AM. Q. 682, 694 (2000); cf. LEONARD W. LEVY, BLASPHEMY: 
VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED, FROM MOSES TO SALMAN RUSHDIE 401–23 (1993) 
(discussing early blasphemy cases). 
136  Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206, 221 (1838). 
137  See, e.g., Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) at 217, 219–20; People v. Ruggles, 8 
Johns. 290, 291–92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811); Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 
394, 395 (Pa. 1824). 
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preference for an individual liberty conception of religious freedom 
rather than one based on governmental neutrality. 
The most famous nineteenth-century blasphemy case was an 1811 
appeal of the conviction of John Ruggles, who allegedly had shouted in 
public that Jesus Christ was the illegitimate child of a promiscuous 
mother.138 Ruggles was convicted but appealed, arguing in part that New 
York’s constitutional guarantee of religious freedom had abrogated the 
common-law crime of blasphemy.139 Ruggles never alleged that his 
religious beliefs compelled him to attack the prevailing Christian 
understanding of Jesus’ virgin birth. Rather, he argued that the 
dissolution of an established church removed any state interest or 
authority in mediating religious arguments.140 
Chief Justice James Kent delivered the opinion of the court: “The 
free, equal, and undisturbed enjoyment of religious opinion . . . is 
granted and secured; but to revile, with malicious and blasphemous 
contempt, the religion professed by almost the whole community, is an 
abuse of that right.”141 Later in the opinion he added, 
[The state constitution’s religious freedom provision] (noble and 
magnanimous as it is, when duly understood) never meant to 
withdraw religion in general, and with it the best sanctions of moral 
and social obligation, from all consideration and notice of the law. It 
will be fully satisfied by a free and universal toleration, without any of 
the tests, disabilities, or discriminations, incident to a religious 
establishment.142   
Further clarifying the constitutionality of uneven treatment for various 
religious groups, Kent acknowledged that the crime of blasphemy 
applied only to anti-Christian remarks.143 Yet he dismissed Ruggles’s 
insistence that the guarantee of free exercise “without preference or 
discrimination” meant that the state had to treat all inflammatory 
religious critiques equally: 
Nor are we bound, by any expressions in the constitution, as some 
have strangely supposed, either not to punish at all, or to punish 
indiscriminately the like attacks upon the religion of Mahomet or of 
the grand Lama . . . . [I]mputation of malice could not be inferred from 
any invectives upon superstitions equally false and unknown.144 
According to Kent, Christianity was the religion of the people, and the 
state could therefore punish malicious attacks against it.145 
                                                 
138  Ruggles, 8 Johns. at 290–91. 
139  Id. at 291–92.  
140  See id. 
141  Id. at 292, 295. 
142  Id. at 296. 
143  See id. at 295.  
144  Id. 
145  Id. 
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Constitutionally guaranteed religious freedom did not necessarily mean 
that all attacks on religion had to be treated equally.146 
Other courts offered similar rationales for punishing blasphemy in 
spite of religious freedom clauses. “While our own free constitution 
secures liberty of conscience and freedom of religious worship to all,” the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held in Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 
“it is not necessary to maintain that any man should have the right 
publicly to vilify the religion of his neighbours and of the country. These 
two privileges are directly opposed.”147 Indeed, the court was careful to 
point out that blasphemy prosecutions did not punish individuals for 
their religious beliefs or practices. Writing for the court, Justice Duncan 
stated, “I do not think [blasphemy prosecutions] will be an invasion of 
any man’s right of private judgment, or of the most extended privilege of 
propagating his sentiments with regard to religion, in the manner which 
he thinks most conclusive.”148 In short, the statements at issue in 
Updegraph were not a form of religious practice and therefore fell 
outside the bounds of constitutionally protected religious freedom.149 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision in State v. Jasper 
elaborates on the Updegraph court’s distinction between liberty and 
license.150 The dispute arose when Henry Jasper attended a Baptist 
worship service and began “talking and laughing in a loud voice, and by 
then and there making divers ridiculous and indecent actions and 
grimaces.”151 Rather than being indicted for nuisance, trespass, or breach 
of the peace, Jasper was charged and convicted for disturbing a religious 
service.152 On appeal, the justices considered the validity of Jasper’s 
conviction for a seemingly novel offense.153   
In upholding Jasper’s conviction, the decision emphasized the 
importance of religious freedom under the state constitution, which 
stated that “all persons shall be at liberty to exercise their own mode of 
worship.”154 Writing for the court, Chief Justice Thomas Ruffin stated 
that this “provision does not profess to confer this right. It is worded, so 
as to show that it is acknowledged as pre-existing. The right is declared 
                                                 
146  Id. 
147  11 Serg. & Rawle 394, 408 (Pa. 1824). 
148  Id. at 409. 
149  Id.  
150  15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 323, 326–27 (1833). A short summary of this case also appears in 
Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free Exercise: Two Approaches and Their 
History, 47 B.C. L. REV. 275, 308–09 (2006). 
151  Jasper, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) at 323. 
152  Id. at 324. 
153  Id. at 325. 
154  N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIV, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 35, at 2787, 2793.  
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in the Bill of Rights to be a natural and unalienable right in all men.”155 
Therefore, Ruffin declared, 
The worship of God is not therein treated as indifferent, either in 
reference to the welfare of individuals, or the common interest. On the 
contrary, it is assumed to be a moral duty incumbent upon all men, 
and their highest privilege, as intelligent and accountable beings; a 
duty, that is best performed, both in honour to God, the comfort of 
each man and the peace and order of society, when that natural 
privilege is subjected to no legal restraints nor allowed to be disturbed 
by any person, either with or without the pretence of authority.156 
Thus, Jasper’s prosecution was not only constitutionally valid, but it 
actually furthered specific constitutional objectives. “[R]eligion needs no 
aid from the civil power,” Ruffin wrote.157 Instead, religion needed only 
“the guaranty of its freedom from interruption, either by unjust laws or 
lawless force, or wantonness of individuals. Against the former, the 
Constitution is an express warrant, and by a necessary construction 
from that, as it seems to me, it equally forbids the latter.”158 
The Jasper decision rests on the idea that the government has an 
affirmative duty to protect private rights by allowing individuals to seek 
redress in court when those rights are violated.159 In another religious 
disturbance case, Chief Judge William Cranch of the United States 
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia explained,  
The principles upon which the disturbance of public worship 
becomes an offence at common law are these: Every man has a perfect 
right to worship God in the manner most conformable to the dictates 
of his conscience, and to assemble and unite with others in the same 
act of worship, so that he does not interfere with the equal rights of 
others. The common law protects this right, either by giving the party 
his private action for damages on account of the injury he has 
sustained; or if the violation of the right be directly, or consequentially 
injurious to society, by a public prosecution.160 
                                                 
155  Jasper, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) at 324. 
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157  Id. at 326. 
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159  Accord Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (listing 
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In other words, because the right to religious freedom was individually 
held, the government was not the only one who could interfere with free 
exercise. Individuals also could violate that right, just as they could have 
done in the state of nature. As the Delaware Supreme Court observed in 
1839, religious disturbances by private individuals “violated the 
constitutional right of every [congregant] to the free exercise of religious 
worship without molestation.”161 When that right was violated, the 
governmental duty to protect private rights justified prosecution of the 
offenders.162 The logic of this argument may seem odd, but in nineteenth-
century terms it made perfect sense because the unalienable right of free 
exercise was a natural right, not a guarantee of governmental neutrality. 
It would be easy to dismiss nineteenth-century blasphemy cases and 
the Jasper decision as illegitimately infused with a parochial pro-
Christian bias. What this Article hopefully demonstrates, however, is 
that regardless of any judicial predisposition to bend the law to advance 
Christianity (or punish dissenters), the decisions were at least consistent 
with prevailing views of religious freedom. The constitutional guarantee 
of an equally protected right to religious freedom was not considered a 
requirement that the government treat all religions equally. Rather, the 
government could not infringe upon—and sometimes it even had to 
affirmatively protect—the right of individuals to worship God according 
to their own consciences. 
D. Religious Assessments 
Blasphemy laws were not the only way that American states tried 
to support religion. Although most newly independent states eliminated 
any formal recognition of an established church,163 some states continued 
to levy taxes, often called religious assessments, for the support of 
ministers.164 Unlike religious tests for witnesses and legislators, these 
laws did not withhold certain privileges on the basis of religious belief, 
and generally all individuals had to pay the assessments regardless of 
their religious views.165 Nonetheless, while the collection of assessment 
taxes was neutral, the use of those taxes was not. Unless the law 
provided an exemption, assessment taxes supported a minister from the 
established church, or a minister preferred by the majority of local 
                                                 
161  State v. Townsend, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 543, 547 (1839); see also Carl Zollmann, 
Disturbance of Religious Meetings in the American Law, 49 AM. L. REV. 880, 880–81 (1915) 
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taxpayers.166 Thus, religious dissenters often vehemently opposed 
assessment laws and argued instead for governmental neutrality toward 
religion. Perhaps not surprisingly, these dissenters frequently invoked 
religious liberty.   
Early nineteenth-century debates in Massachusetts illustrate the 
arguments on both sides of the assessments controversy. Massachusetts 
law provided that dissenters could designate their religious taxes for the 
support of their own pastors.167 In 1810, the state’s Supreme Judicial 
Court considered a case in which a minister from a minority sect known 
as the Universalists claimed a right to public funds pursuant to that 
statute.168 Universalists, however, were only beginning to view 
themselves as a distinct sect separate from their Congregationalist 
forbearers.169 More importantly, the legislature had not yet recognized 
their incorporation, which was a precondition for receiving funds under 
the assessment law.170 Undeterred by this legislative inaction, the 
Universalist minister argued that the court should broadly construe the 
assessment law’s exemption provision: “[W]hen a man disapproves of 
any religion, or of any supported doctrines of any religion,” the minister 
argued, “to compel him by law to contribute money for public instruction 
in such religion or doctrine, is an infraction of his liberty of 
conscience . . . .”171  
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the minister’s religious liberty 
argument.172 Writing for the court, Chief Justice Theophilus Parsons 
explained, 
                                                 
166  Id. at 756. 
167  See An ACT providing for the public Worship of GOD, and other Purposes therein 
mentioned, and for repealing the Laws heretofore made relating to this Subject (1800), in 3 
THE PERPETUAL LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 105, 106 (I. Thomas & 
E.T. Andrews eds., 1801). The law provided, 
That when any person taxed in any such tax or assessment voted to be raised 
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any such tax or assessment of a different sect or denomination from that of the 
corporation, body politic or religious society by which said tax was so assessed, 
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169  Id. at 402. 
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When it is remembered that no man is compellable to attend on 
any religious instruction, which he conscientiously disapproves, and 
that he is absolutely protected in the most perfect freedom of 
conscience in his religious opinions and worship, the first objection 
seems to mistake a man’s conscience for his money, and to deny the 
state a right of levying and of appropriating the money of the citizens, 
at the will of the legislature, in which they all are represented.173 
According to Parsons, “The great error lies in not distinguishing between 
liberty of conscience in religious opinions and worship, and the right of 
appropriating money by the state. The former is an unalienable right; 
the latter is surrendered to the state, as the price of protection.”174 
Religious dissenters may not wish to fund the propagation of majority 
religious views, he remarked, but paying taxes does not infringe upon 
their free exercise of religion.175 
Assessment debates at the 1820 Massachusetts Constitutional 
Convention reflect similar understandings of religious liberty. In a 
lengthy discussion of religious freedom, most delegates strongly rejected 
the notion that religious taxes infringed upon the rights of conscience.176 
George Blake’s comment exemplified the delegates’ frequent retorts: 
“The question was not a question of conscience, but of pounds shillings 
and pence. There was no injunction in [the assessment law] to attend at 
any particular place of public worship: every man might attend where he 
pleased.”177 In other words, liberty of conscience is unalienable, but 
governmental power to distribute taxes in favor of certain religious 
groups does not implicate that basic freedom. Dissenters objected to this 
favoritism, but the assessment law left them free to practice their own 
religion without interference. 
E. The 1821 New York Convention 
With a sizeable Catholic population178 and a thriving community of 
religious dissenters in the western part of the state,179 New York’s 
history is full of debates about religious liberty. In 1811, for instance, 
New York’s highest court upheld the blasphemy conviction of John 
                                                 
173  Id. Parsons continued, “[I]f any individual can lawfully withhold his contribution, 
because he dislikes the appropriation, the authority of the state to levy taxes would be 
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175  Id. at 417–18. 
176  BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, supra note 126, at 167.  
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Ruggles for disparaging Jesus’ virgin birth.180 Only nine years later, the 
court again handed down a widely publicized case, this time affirming 
the state’s authority to exclude atheists and Universalists from 
testifying in court.181 In the intervening years, lower courts decided two 
prominent cases addressing the right of individuals to receive religious 
exemptions from common-law evidence rules.182 
Early proponents of neutrality usually accepted the premise of the 
individual liberty theory but interpreted that theory broadly so as to 
incorporate neutrality principles. Oliver Ellsworth, for instance, argued 
that individuals should not be required to divulge their religious beliefs, 
and therefore, laws relying on such statements were per se 
unconstitutional.183 Debates at the 1821 New York Constitutional 
Convention, however, demonstrate that the two theories of religious 
freedom occasionally collided, with neutrality advocates wanting to 
displace rather than expand upon the individual liberty approach. In 
particular, some neutrality proponents hinted that accommodations for 
religious scruples constituted a religious preference inconsistent with the 
equal right of free exercise. 
Controversy in the 1821 Constitutional Convention first surfaced 
over whether Quakers should receive exemptions from militia service 
and, if so, whether they should have to pay an equivalent fee.184 State 
legislator Erastus Root, the champion of the neutrality position, argued 
against accommodations for Quakers. “The consequence” of such 
accommodations, he argued, “is, that the state is overrun with 
Quakers—both wet and dry.”185 Instead, Root wanted to “amend the 
constitution, as to bring them up to the work. He would place them all on 
the same muster roll.”186 Root then took aim at the government’s lack of 
religious neutrality, proposing a constitutional guarantee that “[t]he 
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judiciary shall not declare any particular religion, to be the law of the 
land; nor exclude any witness on account of his religious faith.”187 This 
latter proposal attempted to repudiate the state supreme court’s recent 
decisions in Ruggles and Gridley.188   
Root’s proposals met a cool reception in the convention. Chancellor 
James Kent replied that blasphemy was punishable  
not because christianity was established by law, but because 
christianity was in fact the religion of this country, the rule of our 
faith and practice, and the basis of the public morals. . . . The court 
never intended to interfere with any religious creeds or sects, or with 
religious discussions.189   
According to Chancellor Kent, “[t]he constitution had declared that there 
was to be ‘no discrimination or preference in religious profession or 
worship.’ But Christianity was, in fact, the religion of the people of this 
state, and that fact was the principle of the decision.”190 Rufus King 
agreed. “While all mankind are by our constitution tolerated, and free to 
enjoy religious profession and worship within this state,” the senator and 
former delegate at the Federal Constitutional Convention declared, “the 
religious professions of the Pagan, the Mahomedan, and the Christian, 
are not, in the eye of the law, of equal truth and excellence. . . . While the 
constitution tolerates the religious professions and worship of all men, it 
does more in behalf of the religion of the gospel.”191 In other words, all 
were equally free to practice their own religions, but the government 
could still treat religions differently so long as there was no interference 
with religious beliefs and worship. 
The delegates eventually voted by a margin of sixty-two to twenty-
six in favor of a provision stating, “It shall not be declared or adjudged 
that any particular religion is the law of the land.”192 Far from being a 
victory for Root, however, many delegates viewed the amendment as 
purely symbolic.193 Chancellor Kent voted for the measure, later noting 
that “[i]t was perfectly harmless, and might be a security. No judge 
would think of making any particular religion a part of the law of the 
land.”194 For Chancellor Kent, the provision guaranteed non-
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establishment rather than strict governmental neutrality. Root then 
reintroduced his proposal to allow witnesses to testify irrespective of 
their religious faith.195 One delegate supported the motion, stating that 
“we should be above such prejudices, and act on the broad principles of 
liberty.”196 After several comments regarding the efficacy of oaths, the 
delegates voted against Root’s proposal by a vote of ninety-four to 
eight.197 
Still stinging from defeat, Root returned several days later to his 
fight against religious exemptions for Quakers.198 The delegates 
primarily wrangled over how to determine whether conscientious 
objectors were sincere in their religious scruples. Responding to Root’s 
argument that many people were only pretending to harbor 
conscientious scruples, Judge Ambrose Spencer, author of the recent 
testimonial-exclusion opinion in Gridley, stated that “we have reason to 
think [Quakers are] very sincere. They abstain from the use of sugar and 
molasses, and all other articles which are produced by the means of 
slavery.”199 Judge Spencer continued, 
These men are also abridged in the right of suffrage; by neglecting to 
do military duty, many of them will lose the privilege of voting; and 
there is not the least probability that men will turn Quakers merely to 
get clear of military duty. This was a subject which might be safely left 
to the legislature to determine; and it would certainly be much more 
appropriate for that body to decide the question, than for this 
Convention, under existing circumstances, to do it.200 
Not everyone agreed with Judge Spencer’s optimistic appraisal.201 There 
was broad consensus, however, that the rights of conscience should be 
protected for genuine conscientious objectors.202 One delegate noted, 
If scruples of conscience are ever acknowledged to be sincere, why 
should they now be violated, and a whole religious sect be arraigned 
for hypocrisy? Were they not as likely to be as honest and sincere in 
their professions, as any other class of Christians; and should we act 
upon the supposition that all religious professions were hypocritical 
and false?203   
After a colloquy between several delegates regarding “the rights of 
conscience,” the convention voted to exempt Quakers, although it also 
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provided for an equivalent to be levied “according to the expense, in time 
and money, of an ordinary able-bodied militia-man.”204 
CONCLUSION 
New York’s elder jurists, including Kent, Spencer, and King, 
prevailed over Root in their fight to maintain an individual liberty view 
of religious freedom without simultaneously recognizing a broader right 
against governmental classifications based on religious beliefs. 
Meanwhile, Root and his supporters never explicitly denounced an 
individual liberty conception of religious freedom. They merely 
questioned the sincerity of conscientious objectors. Yet their 
simultaneous attacks on testimonial exclusions, blasphemy prosecutions, 
and legislative accommodations exposed the priority these delegates 
placed on governmental neutrality. In subsequent decades, neutrality 
arguments became more prevalent and well-accepted.205 States gradually 
removed testimonial exclusion rules, test oaths, and religious 
assessments.206 
Although the Supreme Court has exalted neutrality as the core of 
religious liberty, early nineteenth-century debates reveal that this focus 
on neutrality has not always prevailed. In fact, by viewing religious 
freedom as an unalienable natural right rather than a government-
created right, most early jurists and legislators understood religious 
freedom primarily in terms of individual liberty. As neutrality cases 
demonstrate, they considered infringements on religious practice to be a 
necessary component of a free exercise claim. Governments routinely 
classified individuals on the basis of religious belief, but these laws 
withstood constitutional scrutiny because they did not directly interfere 
with religious practices. When neutrality proponents attacked these 
classifications by invoking religious freedom, the usual response was a 
terse reminder that the unalienable right of conscience did not remove 
religion from the purview of legislative power.   
To be sure, states also recognized nascent principles of 
governmental neutrality. The federal and state establishment clauses, 
for example, circumscribed governmental power over religion. The key 
thing to keep in mind, though, is that while state establishment clauses 
gradually moved further toward a neutrality-based view of proper 
governmental powers, the unalienable right of free exercise continued to 
                                                 
204  Id. at 579–80 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no recorded vote 
regarding the exemption for Quakers. The vote was eighty-eight to twenty-eight in favor of 
retaining a provision for militia service equivalents. Id. 
205  For one story of this change, see Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the 
Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 
1100–05 (1995). 
206  Id. at 1117. 
 REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:311 348 
protect individuals. As John Witte writes, “Where general laws and 
policies did intrude on the religious scruples of an individual or group, 
liberty of conscience demanded protection of religious minorities through 
exemptions from such laws and policies. This was the heart of the 
meaning of religious toleration.”207 This did not, of course, mean that all 
individuals became judges of their own causes with respect to religious 
exemptions. Government still had to decide whether religious objections 
were sincere and whether providing exemptions would disturb the peace. 
At its core, however, religious freedom protected the unalienable, 
individual right to worship God according to the dictates of conscience. 
In 1978, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to Tennessee’s 
prohibition against ministers serving as legislators.208 The Court 
unanimously struck down the rule, which had existed in Tennessee’s 
constitution since 1796.209 Not surprisingly, nearly all the justices 
thought the prohibition violated the Free Exercise Clause because it 
discriminated against religion.210 Yet, oddly enough, Justice Byron White 
disagreed. The majority, he argued, “fails to explain in what way [the 
plaintiff minister] has been deterred in the observance of his religious 
beliefs. Certainly he has not felt compelled to abandon the ministry as a 
result of the challenged statute, nor has he been required to disavow any 
of his religious beliefs.”211 For that reason, Justice White was “not 
persuaded that the Tennessee statute in any way interferes with [the 
minister’s] ability to exercise his religion as he desires,” and therefore 
the provision did not offend the Free Exercise Clause.212 Instead, Justice 
White would have overturned Tennessee’s ministerial exclusion as a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.213 
Justice White’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause embodies 
an older understanding that has long since fallen out of favor. When 
assessing religious freedom claims, courts no longer consider whether a 
law actually interferes with an individual’s religious beliefs or 
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worship.214 Rather, governmental neutrality has taken over as the 
preeminent concern of the Free Exercise Clause. This neutrality-based 
understanding of religious freedom is not inherently incompatible with 
the individual liberty theory. Indeed, the comments of Oliver Ellsworth 
and James Prince illustrate that neutrality itself originated, at least in 
part, as an extension of individual liberty principles. In the years since, 
however, Supreme Court jurisprudence has lost touch with this original 
understanding. Perhaps not surprisingly, exalting neutrality as the core 
value of religious freedom has colored how we think about whether 
religious exemptions fall within the purview of free exercise. From a 
neutrality-centered perspective, the idea of granting religious 
exemptions seems expansive or perhaps even radical.  
Yet the founding generation did not operate under these 
assumptions. Far from being radical, exemptions were standard practice 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Meanwhile, 
governmental neutrality was the more expansive theory of religious 
liberty and a greater threat to the status quo. Prolific, yet largely 
neglected, neutrality debates help clarify this original understanding of 
free exercise as an unalienable right rather than as a religion-specific 
precursor to modern equal protection principles.   
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